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strategic pricing decisions made at the level of the individual firm can have significant effects 
on the volatility and cross country co-movement of GDP and its components. Specifically 
we show that the addition of this one channel for strategic interaction leads to a significant 
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significant decrease in the volatility of investment and the trade balance over the benchmark 
IRBC model. 
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The recent attention to the role of markup variability in the international trade and ￿nance
literature is quite remarkable. Not surprisingly, given that markup variability provides a
wedge between change in marginal costs and changes in prices, many (but not all) of these
studies incorporate endogenous markup variability into a model with nominal rigidities to
explain price or exchange rate dynamics.1
In addition, some models have employed variable markups to explain either national
or international quantity dynamics, but these papers usually focus on the role of markup
variability in conjunction with endogenous ￿rm entry and exit.2
This paper constructs a model to evaluate the role of endogenous markup variability
in a⁄ecting international quantity dynamics. However, unlike most of the papers in this
literature, this paper abstracts from the role of endogenous ￿rm entry and exit in order to
focus speci￿cally on how strategic decisions made at the level of the individual ￿rm can
aggregate up to have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the volatility and international co-movement of
GDP and its components.
Speci￿cally we will examine how including endogenous markup variability in an interna-
tional real business cycle model (IRBC) a⁄ects the relative volatility of consumption, invest-
ment, net exports and employment and the cross-country correlation of GDP, consumption,
investment, and employment. These statistics, as presented in Backus et al. (1995, hence-
forth BKK), Chari et al. (2002, henceforth CKM) and Ambler et al. (2004, henceforth
ACZ), are reproduced in table 1. The table also presents the results from the benchmark
international real business cycle model in BKK (1995).
These statistics are chosen speci￿cally because these are the key points where the bench-
1Dotsey and King (2005) show how markup variability can a⁄ect in￿ ation dynamics, namely the persis-
tence of in￿ ation and prices. Bouakez (2005) develops a model with markup variability and nominal rigidities
that can help explain real exchange rate persistence. Sbordone (2007) shows the e⁄ect of variable markups
on international in￿ ation dynamics. Atkeson and Burstein (2008) model how markup variability can explain
deviations of international relative prices from purchasing power parity. Gust et al. (2010) construct a
model where markup variability is responsible for the incomplete pass through of exchange rate changes into
import prices.
2Cook (2002) presents a model where endogenous ￿rm entry and markup variability lead to an increase
in cross-country business cycle co-movement. Melitz (2003) shows how ￿rm heterogeneity, endogenous ￿rm
entry and exit and variable demand elasticities can explain why some ￿rms export and others only supply
the domestic market. Ruhl (2005) uses a similar model to show how endogenous ￿rm entry can a⁄ect the
elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods. With a closed economy model, Jaimovich and
Floetto (2009) show how variable markups and endogenous ￿rm entry leads to a propagation mechanism
that can signi￿cantly increase the volatility of business cycle ￿ uctuations following productivity shocks. In
addition, Arkolakis and Ramanarayanan (2009) show how markup variability and heterogenous ￿rms may
be necessary to explain the link between bilateral trade and the endogenous transfer of measured TFP
￿ uctuations.
2mark IRBC model fails to match the data. Namely, the model￿ s predictions for consumption
and employment volatility are too low, while those for investment and net export volatility are
too high. Furthermore, the model￿ s prediction for cross-country consumption co-movement is
far too high, and the model predicts negative GDP, investment, and employment correlation.
Table 1: Volatility and cross-country co-movement of GDP and its components in the data
and in the benchmark IRBC model.
Data Model
BKK (1995) CKM (2002) ACZ (2004) BKK (1995)
Volatility relative to GDP:
Consumption 0:75 0:83 0:42
Investment 3:27 2:78 10:99
Net Exports 0:27 0:11 2:51
Employment 0:61 0:67 0:50
Cross-country correlation:
GDP 0:66 0:60 0:22 ￿0:21
Consumption 0:51 0:38 0:14 0:88
Investment 0:53 0:33 0:18 ￿0:94
Employment 0:33 0:39 0:20 ￿0:78
Many papers have shown how various permutations of the benchmark IRBC model can
help resolve these discrepancies between the model and the data.3 Without doubting the
validity of these contributions we propose an additional channel that may help resolve these
well known discrepancies between the benchmark IRBC model and the data, the channel
through which the sum of strategic decisions made at the level of individual ￿rms can have
signi￿cant aggregate e⁄ects.
Our work adapts the international real business cycle model of Backus et al. (1994) to
a game-theoretic environment. In the model, intermediate goods from home and foreign
￿rms are aggregated in a discretized Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) aggregator function. Like in
the closed economy model in Yang and Heijdra (1993), when deciding its optimal output
price, the ￿rm takes into account the e⁄ect of its price on the aggregate price level. Thus a
strategic game arises where a ￿rm must take into account the impact of its pricing decision
3See Baxter and Crucini (1993) for, among other things, a discussion of the role of capital adjustment
costs in increasing the relative volatility of consumption and reducing the relative volatility of investment.
Baxter and Crucini (1995), Kehoe and Perri (2002), and Heathcote and Perri (2002 and 2003) show that
cross-country consumption correlation falls and cross-country GDP correlation increases when international
asset markets are restricted. Kose and Yi (2001), Ambler et al. (2002), and Burstein et al. (2008) show
that it is possible to raise the level of international business cycle co-movement by altering the production
process to allow for trade in intermediate inputs in the production process.
3on the aggregate price level and thus on all other ￿rms￿pricing decisions.4
The extent to which a ￿rm can in￿ uence the aggregate price level and the prices set by
other ￿rms is determined by the ￿rm￿ s market share. A ￿rm with a higher market share
has greater market power, and this greater market power allows the ￿rm to charge a higher
markup over marginal cost. Cyclical changes in the import share that arise in an international
real business cycle model as a result of country speci￿c productivity shocks lead to cyclical
changes in domestic and foreign ￿rms￿market power and thus cyclical changes in domestic
or export markups.
The link between an increasing market share of foreign ￿rms and a decreasing domestic
markup is well established in the empirical literature. Tybout (2003) provides a survey of
ample empirical evidence on how markups generally fall as import competition rises (see,
also, Katics and Peterson, 1994; Tribble, 1995; Konings and Vandenbussche, 2005; Blonigen
et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2009), while Becarello (1997) especially emphasizes the empirical
signi￿cance of such markup variability and the impact of import competition at the business
cycle frequency.
This markup variability in response to a changing import share reduces the volatility of
￿ uctuations in GDP, investment, and net exports. In addition markup variability leads to
greater international co-movement in production, investment and employment. The intuition
is as follows. Suppose there is a positive shock to foreign productivity. Foreign marginal
costs fall. The relative price of foreign products decreases. Foreign producers will increase
production and domestic producers will cut production. Thus the foreign shock leads to
volatile business cycle ￿ uctuations and international business cycle divergence.
Foreign producers gain market share at the expense of domestic producers, and thus
foreign markups increase while domestic markups fall. These changes in markups cause the
relative price of foreign goods to increase. Thus variability in markups causes a change
in relative prices that is exactly opposite the change due to the initial productivity shock.
Home and foreign business cycles will ￿ uctuate less than they would have without variable
markups.
Since home ￿rms ￿nd themselves at a comparative disadvantage following the foreign
productivity shock they cut production for a period of time. Therefore the productivity
shock leads to business cycle divergence and negative bilateral GDP correlation. When
there is endogenous markup variability, the changes in the markups of home and foreign
￿rms place home ￿rms at less of a comparative disadvantage and they return to pre-shock
levels of production sooner. Thus with endogenous markup variability there is less bilateral
4We consider both the cases where this strategic interaction arises from ￿rms engaged in quantity com-
petition (Cornot) or price competition (Bertrand).
4business cycle divergence following a country speci￿c productivity shock and higher bilateral
cyclical correlation.
When adding a channel for strategic interaction between domestic and foreign ￿rms to
an otherwise ordinary IRBC model, we ￿nd that strategic interaction leads to a nearly 12
percentage point increase in cross-country GDP correlation. In addition we ￿nd that cross-
country investment and employment correlation increase by 11 and 15 percentage points,
respectively.5
Furthermore, a channel for strategic interaction leads to a 5% increase in the relative
volatility of consumption, a 5% decrease in the relative volatility of investment, and an 11%
decrease in the relative volatility of net exports.
This paper will proceed as follows. In section 2 the model is described and a part of the
model is solved in order to ￿nd a closed form expression for a ￿rm￿ s elasticity of demand as
a function of its market share. The parameterization of the model and the exogenous shock
process is described in section 3. The results from the model are presented in section 4. First
we log linearize part of the model to provide some intuition for how markup variability should
a⁄ect volatility and co-movement. Then we simulate the model to show the quantitative




There are two countries, home and foreign. Foreign variables are written with an asterisk
and home variables are not. In the following description of the model, foreign equations are
omitted for brevity.
An aggregate good is used by households for consumption and investment, Ct and It.
This aggregate good, yt, is formed through the combination of domestic and imported ￿nal
goods, which are combined in an Armington (1969) aggregator function with an elasticity of
substitution ￿.














where yD;t are domestically produced ￿nal goods and yM;t are imported ￿nal goods.
5To put this in perspective, in their seminal paper, Frankel and Rose (1998) ￿nd that the doubling of
trade between two countries leads to about an 8 percentage point increase in bilateral GDP correlation and
a 10 percentage point increase in bilateral employment correlation (see also Clark and van Wincoop, 2001;
Baxter and Kouparitsas, 2005; Kose and Yi, 2006; Calder￿n et al., 2007)
5The demand for domestically produced or imported ￿nal goods as a function of aggregate
consumption and investment spending is:
yD;t = ! (pt)
￿￿ yt (2)








where pt is the price of home ￿nal goods relative to the price of the home consumption good,
p￿
t is the price of foreign ￿nal goods relative to price of the foreign consumption good, qt is
the real exchange rate measured in units of the foreign consumption good per units of the
home consumption good, and c is an iceberg trade cost parameter.
Goods shipped internationally are subject to an iceberg trade cost, so when 1 unit of a






(1￿c), where yX;t and
y￿
X;t are home and foreign exports of ￿nal goods.
Final goods, which are to be sold domestically or exported, are produced from the com-
bination of value added at the ￿nal goods stage and intermediate inputs.




















where hyt and Kyt are labor and capital employed in the production of ￿nal goods, At is a
country speci￿c total factor productivity parameter, xt are intermediate inputs, and ￿ is the
elasticity of substitution between value added and intermediate inputs in the production of
￿nal goods.
The demand for intermediate inputs in the production of ￿nal goods is given by:






(yD;t + yX;t) (4)
where px
t is the relative price of intermediate inputs.
The intermediate input term xt in the production of ￿nal goods is made up of a combi-






























t is the relative price of intermediate goods from sector j.
The intermediate good from sector j is formed by combining ￿rm speci￿c varieties from
N home ￿rms and N￿ foreign ￿rms in sector j. We use the convention that ￿rms denoted

















t (i) is the intermediate good from ￿rm i in sector j.
Firm i can supple to either the home or the foreign market. For notational clarity,
suppose that x
j
D;t (i) and x
j
X;t (i) are the quantities that the ￿rm supplies to the home and






































Again we see that traded intermediate inputs are subject to an iceberg trade cost. The
price of the intermediate good from sector j, p
j





























The total quantity sold by ￿rm i in sector j for both the domestic and foreign markets
is produced from a combination of domestic capital and labor.
x
j
D;t (i) + x
j










￿   (11)
where h
j
t (i) and K
j
t (i) is labor and capital employed by ￿rm i in sector j, At is an exogenous
country speci￿c productivity shock, and   is a ￿xed cost which ensures that ￿rms earn zero
7pro￿t in the steady state..
2.2 Households
The one representative household per country derives utility from consumption and leisure.




















t (i)dj is aggre-
gate labor supplied by the domestic household to both ￿nal goods production, hyt, and to








We assume that international asset markets are complete. We can model this by assuming
households share one worldwide budget constraint:































where wt is the home wage rate (in terms of the home consumption good), rt is the rental rate







t (i)dj, and ￿
j











t (i) ￿ rtK
j
t (i) is the pro￿t at time t of the home ￿rm i in sector j.
Finally, the home capital stock evolves according to the following:
Kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Kt + It (14)
where ￿ is the one-period depreciation rate of capital.
2.3 The ￿rm￿ s maximization problem
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X;t (i) ￿ MCt 
￿
(16)









We assume a su¢ cient degree of market segmentation such that ￿rms can price to market,
i.e. the ￿rm is able to set a di⁄erent price for goods sold domestically versus those that are
exported.




































































































































































9are an intermediate good ￿rm￿ s market shares in the home and foreign markets.
























Details of the solution to the ￿rm￿ s problem and the derivation of these elasticities can
be found in the appendix.
The impact of strategic interaction among ￿rms and how that can a⁄ect ￿rm markups
is highlighted by equations (19) and (21). Strategic interaction occurs when a ￿rm takes
into account the e⁄ect of its pricing decision on the aggregate price level, and thus on the
pricing decision of other ￿rms. If the aggregate price level increases after a ￿rm raises its
price then other ￿rms will follow suit and raise their prices as well. Thus the ￿rm that is
able to signi￿cantly in￿ uence the aggregate price level and thus the pricing decisions of other
￿rms has greater market power and will maximize pro￿ts by charging a higher markup.
In equations (19) and (21), the elasticity of demand for the output from ￿rm i is a convex
combination of the technological elasticity of substitution between ￿rms in the same sector
and the elasticity of substitution between sectors. As the ￿rm￿ s market share increases, the
weight on the elasticity of substitution between sectors increases, and thus the elasticity of
demand for the output from ￿rm i decreases. If ￿rm i is small compared to the rest of the
market and thus its market share, s
j
D;t (i), is close to zero, then when setting its price the
￿rm does not take into account the e⁄ect of its decision on other ￿rms. Thus when the
market is made up of many small ￿rms there is no channel for strategic interaction and each
￿rm￿ s demand elasticity reduces to ￿.
3 Parameterization
The model￿ s parameters and their benchmark values are found in table 2.
￿ is the elasticity of substitution across intermediate inputs from di⁄erent ￿rms. We
set this elasticity equal to 10. This is done to match the convention in this literature6 and
ensure that in the extreme case of atomistic ￿rms (N + N￿ ! 1), ￿rms charge a steady
state markup of about 11%, which is common in the literature with imperfect competition
and atomistic ￿rms.
6Atkeson and Burstein (2008) use an elasticity of 10 in a similar model.
10￿ is the elasticity of substitution between goods from di⁄erent sectors. We set this
parameter equal to 1:01. Again this is similar to Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and an
elasticity of substitution close to one ensures that sectoral expenditure shares are roughly
constant.
￿ is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign ￿nal goods. As discussed
in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), in the trade literature, this elasticity is commonly
estimated as somewhere between 5 and 10. However the international macro literature ￿nds
that this elasticity needs to be low, around 1:5, in order to match the variability of the real
exchange rate. Ruhl (2005) attempts to justify these di⁄erent estimates of the same elasticity
in a model with endogenous ￿rm entry. Since we do not consider the role of endogenous ￿rm
entry in this model, we follow the convention in the international macro literature and set
this elasticity to 1:5.
The next six parameters: ￿, the exponent on leisure in the Cobb-Douglas utility function,
￿, the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, ￿, capital￿ s share of income, ￿, the discount factor,
￿, the capital depreciation rate, and ￿, the elasticity of substitution between value added and
intermediate inputs in the production of ￿nal goods, are all set to values commonly found
in the real business cycle literature.
The benchmark ￿xed cost parameter,  , from the ￿rm￿ s production function, is set such
that ￿rms earn zero pro￿t in the steady state.
The next two parameters determine the market share of foreign ￿rms in either the market
for ￿nal goods or the market for intermediate inputs. The trade cost parameter c a⁄ects
both the relative cost of foreign ￿nal goods and the cost of foreign intermediate goods,
although the purpose of this parameter is to determine the steady state market share of
foreign intermediate goods ￿rms. By setting the trade cost parameter equal to 0:159, the
steady state market share of foreign ￿rms in the market for intermediate inputs is equal to
25%.
The parameter ! describes the exogenous home bias for domestically produced ￿nal
goods. This parameter is set to 0:733 to ensure that after accounting for trade costs, the
steady state share of foreign goods in the household￿ s consumption basket is equal to 25%.
The steady state domestic markup is equal to 20%. With this steady state domestic
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("d￿￿) where m is the steady state market share of for-
eign ￿rms in the intermediate goods market.
11Finally, in this real business cycle model, ￿ uctuations in total factor productivity drive
business cycle ￿ uctuations. The At and A￿
t variables in (11) are exogenous country speci￿c
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4 Results
4.1 Qualitative e⁄ect of variable markups
To see how variable markups a⁄ect the cyclical ￿ uctuations in production and aggregate
output, consider the log linearization of the demand function for intermediate goods from
domestic ￿rms in (8):
^ xD;t = ￿￿^ pD;t + ￿^ pt + ^ xt (22)
Note that the sectoral superscripts j have been omitted for clarity.
If we log linearize the price index in (10), then the sectoral price level ^ pt can be expressed
as:







X;t + ^ qt
￿
(23)
where sD and sX, de￿ned in an earlier section, are a home intermediate good ￿rm￿ s market
shares in the home and foreign markets, respectively. Since the N home intermediate goods
￿rms and the N￿ foreign intermediate goods ￿rms are identical, N￿s￿
X;t = m is the market
share of foreign ￿rms in the market for intermediate goods, and NsD;t = 1￿m is the market
share of domestic ￿rms.
Substituting equation (23) into (22) yields the following:
^ xD;t = ￿m
￿
^ qt + ^ p
￿
X;t ￿ ^ pD;t
￿
+ ^ xt (24)





MCt. The foreign export price is equal to a markup multiplied







t . After log-linearizing
these pricing formulas, the log-linearizaed demand function in (24) is:














^ ￿D;t ￿ M ^ Ct
￿
+ ^ xt (25)
where ￿D and ￿￿
X are the steady state values of the domestic and export markups.
Suppose that there is an exogenous change in the foreign marginal cost of production,
MC￿
t . Equation (25) shows that the elasticity of domestic demand with respect to changes
































































Therefore equations (26) and (27) show how the variability of markups can a⁄ect the




to be the change in elasticity when the vari-
























In this model, the markup is an increasing function of market share. Therefore when






< 0. Similarly when foreign cost decrease, domestic producers lose









The key result from this paper is summarized in equation (28).
Markup variability should lead to less business cycle volatility and greater international
business cycle correlation. Suppose there is a positive shock to foreign productivity. Foreign
marginal costs fall, and the relative price of foreign products decreases. Foreign producers
will increase production and domestic producers will cut production. Thus the foreign shock
leads both business cycle volatility and international business cycle divergence.
Foreign producers will gain market share at the expense of domestic producers, and thus
foreign markups increase while domestic markups fall. These changes in markups cause the




is an approximation. Other elasticities like the elasticity of the real exchange








and the elasticity of home gross output, ^ xt
M ^ C￿
t
, should all be a⁄ected by the variability of markups.
13relative price of foreign goods to increase. Thus variability in markups causes a change in
relative prices that is exactly opposite to the change due to the initial productivity shock.
Home and foreign business cycles will be less volatile and will diverge less than they would
have without variable markups.
This sequence of events is illustrated in ￿gures 1 and 2. Figure 1 plots the response of
home and foreign marginal cost and the response of home domestic markups and foreign
export markups to a positive foreign productivity shock. The dotted line in each plot refers
to the path of markups and GDP when markups are constant. Figure 2 plots the price
of domestically produced intermediate goods in the home market and the price of foreign
intermediate goods in the home market, as well as home and foreign GDP. The dotted line
in each impulse response diagram refers to the version of the model where markups are held
constant over the cycle, and the solid line refers to the version of the model where markups
are variable over the cycle and arise from ￿rms engaged in quantity competition, as in (19).9
The top row of impulse response diagrams in ￿gure 1 shows how the positive foreign
TFP shock causes home marginal costs to increase and foreign marginal costs to decrease.
However when this happens, foreign ￿rms gain market share at the expense of domestic ￿rms.
The bottom row in the ￿gure shows that when markups vary over the cycle, foreign ￿rms
will increase their markup in the home markup and domestic ￿rms will cut their markup.
The top row in ￿gure 2 shows how the price of domestically produced intermediate inputs
should rise and the price of foreign intermediate inputs should fall following the foreign TFP
shock. However the ￿gure shows that the price change is smaller if markups vary over the
cycle. Home intermediate goods prices still rise and foreign intermediate goods prices still
fall, but not as much under variable markups as under constant markups. Therefore domestic
production is higher and foreign production is lower than it would have been without variable
markups. Endogenous markup variability means that the initial negative response to home
GDP is less negative, and the initial positive response of foreign GDP is less positive, leading
to less volatile responses in home and foreign GDP following the foreign TFP shock.
Home ￿rms ￿nd themselves at a comparative disadvantage following the foreign produc-
tivity shock and thus they cut production for about 16 quarters. Therefore the productivity
shock leads to business cycle divergence and negative bilateral GDP correlation, which is
a feature of many IRBC models with complete international asset markets. When there
is endogenous markup variability, the changes in the markups of home and foreign ￿rms
place home ￿rms at less of a comparative disadvantage and they return to pre-shock levels
of production after about 10 quarters. Thus with endogenous markup variability there is
less bilateral business cycle divergence following a country speci￿c productivity shock and
9In both cases the steady state markup is 20%.
14bilateral correlation should be higher.
4.2 Quantitative impact of variable markups
4.2.1 Business Cycle Volatility
The volatility of GDP and its components as calculated from simulations of the model are
presented in table 3. The ￿rst two rows of the table present the standard deviation of real
GDP. The remaining rows in the table list the relative standard deviation of the components
of GDP (and labor input). In the table, the data for each entry is computed twice, once in
the model assuming that markups are held constant over the cycle, and once in the model
assuming that markups are allowed to vary over the cycle.
The ￿rst column of the table presents the results from the benchmark parameterization,
as described in section 3. The share of foreign ￿rms in both the intermediate and ￿nal goods
markets is set to 25%. Intermediate goods ￿rms charge a 20% markup in their home market,
￿rms are engaged in quantity competition, international asset markets are complete, and
preferences are non-separable in consumption and leisure.
Under the benchmark parameterization of the model, the standard deviation of real GDP
is 3:25% when markups are held constant and 3:06% when markups are allowed to vary. Thus
allowing markups to vary over the cycle leads to a nearly 6% reduction in GDP volatility.
The table also shows that allowing markups to vary leads to a nearly 6% increase in the
relative volatility of consumption from 0:44 to 0:47, not enough of a change to fully reconcile
the IRBC model￿ s predictions about consumption volatility with the volatility observed in
the data (see table 1) but de￿nitely a signi￿cant move in the right direction.
Another well known feature of the IRBC model is that without investment adjustment
costs, the model￿ s predictions for investment and net export volatility is way too high. Table
3 shows that the inclusion of endogenous markup variability leads to a 5% fall in investment
volatility and an 11% fall in net export volatility.
However the model cannot help resolve the discrepancy between the IRBC model￿ s pre-
diction about employment volatility and that observed in the data. The model consistently
predicts a relative volatility of employment that is below that observed in the data. However
the table shows that the introduction of endogenous markup variability actually reduces the
relative volatility of employment, and thus markup variability cannot help resolve the well
known discrepancy between the model and the data in regards to the relative volatility of
employment.
The remaining columns in the table calculate the same statistics from model simulations
but under alternative parameterizations. The second column reports the results when ￿rms
15are engaged in price competition, the third column reports the results for a 25% steady
state markup, the fourth column reports the results for a 15% steady state markup, the
￿fth column reports the results from a model where the only asset traded internationally
is a non-contingent bond, and the sixth column reports the results from the model where
preferences are separable in consumption and labor e⁄ort. The e⁄ect of markup variability
on the volatility of GDP and its components remains the same under the alternative para-
meterizations. In fact, the e⁄ect is enhanced when ￿rms are engaged in price competition
or the steady state markup is high. When markups are small, markup variability still has
an e⁄ect on volatility, but the e⁄ect is smaller. Similarly the e⁄ect of markup variability is
slightly reduced when asset markets are restricted. Lastly, the results are largely una⁄ected
by the substitutability of leisure and consumption in the utility function.
The e⁄ect of markup variability as the market share of foreign ￿rms increases
The quantitative results in table 3 are calculated assuming that in the steady state foreign
￿rms supply 25% of the intermediate goods used in the home country. The qualitative
results earlier in this section, speci￿cally equation (28), suggests that the quantitative e⁄ect
of markup variability should be increasing in the market share of foreign intermediate goods
￿rms. In this section we will examine the e⁄ect of an increasing foreign market share on
business cycle volatility.
The standard deviation of GDP as calculated from model simulations for di⁄erent steady
state foreign market shares is presented in ￿gure 3. The ￿gure presents the results from
the model assuming markups are held ￿xed over the cycle and assuming that markups are
variable over the cycle. The ￿gure con￿rms the prediction from equation (28) that the role
of variable markups in reducing GDP volatility is increasing in the market share of foreign
￿rms.
The e⁄ect of markup variability on the relative volatility of the components of GDP
are presented in ￿gure 4. The ￿gure con￿rms the results that are presented in table 3.
Endogenous markup variability has a positive e⁄ect on the relative volatility of consumption
and a negative e⁄ect on the relative volatilities of investment, net exports and employment.
Furthermore, this e⁄ect of markup variability is increasing in the market share of foreign
￿rms.
4.2.2 International Business Cycle Co-movement
Similarly, markup variability has a sizeable e⁄ect on international business cycle co-movement.
The results from calculating the cross-country correlation of GDP and its components in the
model with and without markup variability are listed in table 4.
16As discussed in the introduction, bilateral GDP, investment, and employment correlation
is far too low in the benchmark IRBC model with complete international asset markets
and no investment adjustment costs. Furthermore, bilateral consumption correlation in the
model is too high compared to that observed in the data.
In the benchmark case of this model, the correlation between the two countries￿GDP
￿ uctuations is about ￿8% when markups are held constant over the cycle. When markups
are allowed to vary, this correlation coe¢ cient increases to about 4%. Thus endogenous
markup variability leads to a 12 percentage point increase in cross-country GDP correlation.
Similarly allowing markup variability leads to an 11 percentage point increase in investment
co-movement and a 15 percentage point increase in cross-country employment co-movement.
Thus the inclusion of endogenous markup variability partially resolves the well known
puzzle that in the benchmark IRBC model, GDP, investment and employment correlation
is too low. However the model does not help resolve the puzzle about bilateral consumption
correlation being too high. The introduction of endogenous markup variability leads to
about a 1 percentage point increase in cross-country consumption correlation. While that
is the opposite of what is needed to resolve the discrepancy between the model and the
data, the e⁄ect of markup variability on cross-country consumption correlation is about one
order of magnitude smaller than the e⁄ect on GDP, investment, or employment correlation,
so it is safe to say that endogenous markup variability doesn￿ t have much of an e⁄ect on
cross-country consumption correlation.
The remaining columns in the table present the model￿ s simulated correlation coe¢ cients
under alternative parameterizations. The results hold under the various parameterizations,
and in some cases are enhanced. For instance, when markup variability arises from ￿rms
engaged in price competition, cyclical markup variability leads to a 16 percentage point
increase in GDP co-movement, a 14 percentage point increase in investment co-movement,
and a nearly 20 percentage point increase in the cross-country employment correlation.
The e⁄ect of markup variability as the market share of foreign ￿rms increases
The e⁄ect of increasing foreign market share on cross-country GDP correlation is presented
in ￿gure 5. The ￿gure shows that the gap between correlation in the model with variable
markups and that in the model with constant markets is increasing in the foreign market
share. As predicted in equation (28), as foreign ￿rms occupy a greater share of the home
intermediate goods market, allowing markups to vary over the cycle should have a greater
quantitative e⁄ect on the cross-country co-movement of business cycles.
The e⁄ects of variable markups on cross-country GDP correlation of the components of
GDP is presented in ￿gure 6. This ￿gure con￿rms the results from table 4 and shows that
17markup variability has a sizable positive e⁄ect on cross-country investment and employment
co-movement. The ￿gure also shows that the e⁄ect of markup variability is increasing in the
market share of foreign intermediate goods ￿rms.
4.2.3 Using command-basis GDP instead of real GDP
As discussed in Kehoe and Ruhl (2008), when the terms of trade are volatile, real GDP may


















where Ct, It, Xt, Mt are the nominal values of home consumption, investment, exports, and
imports, and P C
t , P I
t , P X
t , P M
t are the de￿ ators for consumption, investment, exports and
imports. As demonstrated by Kehoe and Ruhl, the actual purchasing power of an economy














Notice that the only di⁄erence between the two measures is that the nominal value
of exports is de￿ ated by the import price de￿ ator in the measure of GDI but the export
price de￿ ator in the measure of GDP. The reason the command-basis GDP measure is a
better measure of purchasing power is that Xt ￿ Mt measures the nominal net income from
international trade. By de￿ ating this nominal net income by the import price de￿ ator, you
can measure the actual quantity of goods and services from abroad that an economy was
able to purchase with this net income from international trade.
Algebraically, the only di⁄erence between the measure of real GDP and command-basis
GDP is that in the measure of command-basis GDP, the nominal value of exports is divided
by the terms of trade. Thus if the terms of trade is relatively stable, ￿ uctuations in real
GDP should be similar to ￿ uctuations in command-basis GDP. However if the terms of trade
￿ uctuate, and are positively correlated with ￿ uctuations in exports, then command-basis
GDP should be less volatile and have greater international co-movement that ￿ uctuations
in real GDP.
The results from simulations of the model where we calculate the moments of command-
GDP instead of real-GDP are presented in tables 5 and 6. The table shows that in this model
where business cycles are driven by productivity shocks, ￿ uctuations in command-GDP
are less volatile and display higher international correlation than ￿ uctuations in real GDP,
18however the e⁄ect of endogenous markup variability is unchanged. Endogenous markup
variability has the same qualitative and quantitative e⁄ect on business cycle volatility and
international co-movement even when we consider ￿ uctuations in command-GDP.
The volatility and cross-country correlation of command GDP as the market share of
foreign intermediate goods ￿rms changes is presented in ￿gures 7 and 8. Again, using com-
mand basis GDP instead of real GDP leads to a level shift in the volatility and cross-country
correlation, but the net e⁄ect of introducing endogenous markup variability is unchanged.
5 Summary and Conclusion
This paper introduces strategic interaction among ￿rms and endogenous markup variability
into the international real business cycle model. Speci￿cally this paper shows how this strate-
gic interaction among individual ￿rms can have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on aggregate quantities
at the business cycle frequency.
The intuition here is simple. Due to strategic interactions among ￿rms, a ￿rm￿ s market
power is positively related to its market share. Following a productivity shock in an interna-
tional real business cycle model, there is a change in the relative prices of home and foreign
produced goods that leads to a change in ￿rm market shares.
We ￿nd that the introduction of strategic interaction and the resulting markup variability
into the IRBC model leads to about a 5% decrease in GDP volatility, a 5% increase in the
relative volatility of consumption, and a 5% and 10% decrease in the relative volatilities of
investment and the trade balance, respectively.
Furthermore this strategic interaction among ￿rms leads to a nearly 12 percentage point
increase in bilateral GDP correlation and a 11 and 15 percentage point increase in the cross-
country correlation of investment and employment.
This paper ￿ts into the young but growing literature that applies the microeconomic issue
of endogenous markup variability to macroeconomic questions. Most, but not all, papers
incorporating endogenous markup variability study macroeconomic issues related to prices
and exchange rates. This paper shows that the e⁄ect of strategic interaction on aggregate
quantities is not trivial. The e⁄ect of markup variability on other questions pertaining to
quantities and production allocation is a promising avenue for further research.
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22A Technical Appendix
A.1 The household￿ s maximization problem
The household will maximize the expected present value of lifetime utility, (12), subject to
their budget constraint in (13), and capital accumulation equation, (14).
Under complete international ￿nancial markets, the home and foreign households￿prob-
lems are solved as one maximization problem subject to one worldwide budget constraint
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The ￿rst order conditions with respect to Ct;C￿
t ;ht;h￿
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23A.2 The ￿rm￿ s maximization problem
Firm i in sector j will choose a prices and quantities to maximize pro￿t given by:
￿
j
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X;t (i) ￿ MCt  (31)










The ￿rm engaged in quantity competition will choose quantities x
j
D;t (i) and x
j
X;t (i) to max-
imize (17) subject to the inverse demand functions in (18). After substituting the inverse
demand function into the pro￿t maximization problem, the ￿rm￿ s univariate maximization







































The individual ￿rm￿ s choice of x
j
D;t (i) can in￿ uence total production within sector j, x
j
t,







D;t(i) = (1 ￿ mt) 1
























































A = MCt (32)
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The ￿rm engaged in price competition will choose prices p
j
D;t (i) and p
j
X;t (i) to maximize:
p
j






































































After substituting the demand function into the maximization problem, the ￿rm￿ s uni-
































The individual ￿rm￿ s choice of p
j
D;t (i) can in￿ uence sectoral prices, p
j
t, but not the aggre-
gate price of intermediate inputs, px
t, or the quantity of intermediate inputs from all sectors,
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26Table 2: Parameter Values
Symbol Value Description
￿ 10 elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods producing ￿rms
￿ 1:01 elasticity of substitution across di⁄erent sectors
￿ 1:5 elasticity of substitution across home and foreign ￿nal goods
￿ 0:7 weight on leisure in the utility function
￿ 2 coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
￿ 0:36 capital￿ s share of income
￿ 0:99 discount factor
￿ 0:025 capital depreciation rate
￿ 0:5 elasticity of substitution between value added and intermediate inputs
￿ 0:5 coe¢ cient on value added in the production function for ￿nal goods
  0:321 ￿xed cost parameter (benchmark)
c 0:159 trade cost parameter
! 0:733 exogenous preference for imported goods in the ￿nal goods aggregator function



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































31Figure 1: Response of home and foreign marginal cost and markups to a positive foreign
TFP shock.






















































































































































































32Figure 2: Response of home and foreign prices and GDP to a positive foreign TFP shock.























































































































































































Figure 3: GDP volatility as a function of the steady state market share of foreign intermediate
goods ￿rms, calculated with and without variable markups.




























33Figure 4: The relative volatility of the components of GDP as a function of the steady
state market share of foreign intermediate goods ￿rms, calculated with and without variable
markups.






























































































































Figure 5: Cross-country GDP correlation as a function of the steady state market share of
foreign intermediate goods ￿rms, calculated with and without variable markups.
























34Figure 6: Cross-country correlation of the components of GDP as a function of the steady
state market share of foreign intermediate goods ￿rms, calculated with and without variable
markups.





























































Cross−country net export correlation






























Figure 7: Command GDP volatility as a function of the steady state market share of foreign
intermediate goods ￿rms, calculated with and without variable markups.




























35Figure 8: Cross-country command GDP correlation as a function of the steady state market
share of foreign intermediate goods ￿rms, calculated with and without variable markups.
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